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Symposium
Democracy and the Courts:
The Case of Abortion
LINDA GREENHOUSE*
The topics for this Symposium on Democracy and the Courtsjudicial selection, legal literacy, and the role of public opinion-are so
rich and varied that only in my dreams could I do justice to them in my
allotted time, let alone get my arms around them. So in these remarks, I
will seek to be illustrative rather than comprehensive.
I thought the timing of this Symposium was propitious when I first
heard about it, because there seems to have been a recent explosion of
both scholarly and public interest in the general topic of the relationship
between the Supreme Court and public opinion. Barry Friedman's
excellent new book, The Will of the People,' is just one example. There is

undoubtedly more than one reason for the current flowering of interest
in this age-old topic. One is probably the Court's intervention in the 2000
presidential election, which shone a public spotlight on the Supreme
Court even as it-surprisingly to many people-evidently did little to
dent the Court's public legitimacy.2 Another reason may be recent highprofile cases, from Lawrence v. Texas' to the series of decisions growing
out of the detentions at Guantanamo Bay,4 that have kept the Court in

* Joseph Goldstein Lecturer in Law and Knight Distinguished Journalist-in-Residence, Yale
Law School. This Essay is based on the Keynote Address given at Hastings Law Journal's spring 2010
Symposium, "Democracy and the Courts: Judicial Selection, Legal Literacy, and the Role of Public
Opinion." The Symposium was held at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, on
February 9, 2010.
I. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONsTrUTION (2009).

2. See, e.g., Karlyn Bowman, Supremely Confident, FonEs, Mar. 22, 20Io, http://www.forbes.com/
2olo/o3/21/supreme-court-polls-citizens-united-opinions-columnists-karlyn-bowman.html?boxes=
Homepagemostemailed.

3. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
4. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2oo8); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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the public eye on issues of high cultural and political salience. And a
third possible reason occurs to me-I will get to it in a minute.
There are two mutually exclusive paradigms that express the
relationship between the Supreme Court and the public. One, reflected
by Barry Friedman's book, holds that the Court over time tends to
situate itself in the mainstream of public opinion- although the precise
mechanisms by which it does so are elusive and open to debate.5 This
paradigm deals with the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" by disclaiming
that the Court is counter-majoritarian.
The opposite paradigm is personified by the rejected Supreme
Court nominee, Robert H. Bork. In "A Country I Do Not Recognize":
The Legal Assault on American Values, a collection of essays published
by the Hoover Institution in 2005, Bork states that it is "obtrusively
apparent" that "[t]here exists a fundamental contradiction between
America's most basic ordinance, its constitutional law, and the values by
which Americans have lived and wish to continue to live." 6 Bork sees
"the Supreme Court's departures from the Constitution" as "driven by
'elites' against the express wishes of a majority of the public."' His targets
include what he calls a "concocted" right to privacy and the Court's
commitment to "radical individualism in moral matters amount[ing]
(almost) to nihilism."' Roe v. Wade,9 Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,'o and Lawrence v. Texas" are, not surprisingly,
among Judge Bork's prime examples of Supreme Court decisions that
have hijacked the culture and held it hostage to the Justices' own vision."
This is the counter-majoritarian difficulty on steroids.
These conflicting paradigms, Friedman's and Bork's, are invoked in
nearly any discussion of the Supreme Court's abortion cases, and I will
return to that subject in a minute. But first, I offered a minute ago to
suggest a third possible reason for the spike in interest in our topic.
Assuming, arguendo, the validity of Judge Bork's examples of divergence
between the Court's performance and the public will, all are examples
that place the Court to the left of the public. But I think there is a good
argument that the polarity has shifted in the past few years, and that we
now have, for the first time since the years of the early New Deal, a
Supreme Court that is arguably to the right of the American public. That
5. FRIEDMAN, supra note i, at 374-76.
6. Robert H. Bork, Introduction to "A COUNTRY I Do NOT RECOGNIZE": THE
AMERICAN VALUES, at ix, ix (Robert H. Bork ed., 2005).

LEGAL ASSAULT ON

7. Id.
8. Id. at xiii, xxv.
9.410 U.S. 113 ('973)1o. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

II. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
12. Bork, supra note 6, passirn (citing Roe, 410 U.S. 113; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 505 U.S.
833; Rornerv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558).
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is a phenomenon that few people alive today can actually remember, and
it has interesting political implications that participants in this
Symposium might wish to explore, either here or in their own research.
There was some early evidence that the Roberts Court was moving
to the right of the public. Recall the equal pay case of Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,"3 a case of statutory interpretation that was
promptly overturned by Congress in a bill that President Obama signed
into law as one of his first official acts.' 4 Recall another case from the
same term: Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. i, a constitutional decision that rejected efforts by two school
systems-and dozens or hundreds of others-to preserve the hard-won

gains of integration through the marginal use of racially conscious
student assignment plans."
But it was the decision less than a month ago in Citizens United v.
FEC6 that seems to have truly alarmed the public -as well as making the
timing of this Symposium not only propitious but brilliant. This is not the
occasion to parse the First Amendment holding of that case or to
evaluate the public response to it-a response that I think is at least
somewhat overblown. The fact is that there has been a huge public
response.' 7 That this response is being deftly managed, or one might even
say manipulated, by the Democrats, including the President, should not
lead us to ignore the fact that the Court, in its seemingly boundless
endorsement of constitutional rights for corporations, gave the
Democrats plenty to work with. So just the other day I saw a Web ad
paid for by the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee entitled
"Citizens Before Corporations" and featuring as its visual image
something that looked like a newspaper headline and that read: Court
Rolls Back Decades of Reform: Dems Vow To Fight for Citizens; GOP
Sides with Corporate Money. 1 The ad asked people to sign a petition"Join Democrats in demanding that Republicans support legislation to
reduce runaway corporate spending on elections."' 9 It warned viewers,
The Supreme Court decision of Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission will allow corporate special interests to spend an
unlimited amount of money to influence campaigns, drowning out the

13. 550 U.S. 618 (2oo7).

14. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.

§ 2oooe-5).
I5. 55' U.S. 701, 709-11 (2007) (plurality opinion).
16. 130S. Ct. 876 (2010).
17. See, e.g., Jeanne Cummings, Supreme Court Ruling Fuels Voter Ire, POLrnco, Feb. 9, 2010,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/o2I/32713.html.
i8. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, Citizens Before Corporations, http://www.dscc.org/
petition?petition KEY=-23 3 &track= 2oloo2o 3 -SCOTUS-ActionCenter (last visited June 24, 2010).
19. Id.
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voices of the American people and rolling back decades of progress to
ensure elections are fair. Many Republicans applauded the decision.'
But in fact, more than half the Republicans surveyed two weeks
after the decision was issued said they opposed it, while only thirty-seven
percent favored it." The ruling seems to have alarmed not only
progressives, but the "tea party" populists among Republicans, as well as
Republicans who like the outcome well enough but fear that the five-tofour decision, with Republican-appointed Justices comprising the
majority, will provide potent fodder for the Democrats." For anyone
interested in the relationship between the Court and the public, it is hard
to imagine a more intriguing scenario.
I'd like to use the remainder of my time to say a few words about
the most maddeningly ambiguous example in modem Supreme Court
history of the relationship between the Supreme Court and popular
opinion-the example of Roe v. Wade.23 Roe serves as something of a
Rorschach in which people find the messages they want to see. On the
one hand, it is possible to understand Roe v. Wade as the culmination of
a steady shift in public opinion about abortion that took place over the
preceding decade, outside any courtroom. Barry Friedman observes that
this shift carried such indicators as the American Law Institute's
endorsement of abortion reform in 1962; the almost universal public
sympathy prompted that year by the plight of Sherri Finkbine, the young
mother and children's television host who had to go to Sweden for an
abortion after realizing that sleeping pill she had been taking was
thalidomide; the American Medical Association's dropping of its
longstanding opposition to legal abortion in the late L96os; and the New
York Legislature's repeal of the state's criminal abortion statute in
1970.24

In Harry Blackmun's
Washington Post column by
summer of 1972 that asked
statement that "the decision

file as he was working on Roe was a
George Gallup," reporting on a poll in the
respondents whether they agreed with the
to have an abortion should be made solely

by a woman and her physician." 6

Sixty-three percent of men agreed with that statement.
Sixty-four percent of women agreed.
Sixty-five percent of Protestants agreed.

20. Id.
21.

Cummings, supra note 17.

22. See id.
23.

410 U.S. 113(1973).

24. FRIEDMAN, supra note t, at 2Q97.
25. LINDA

GREENHOUSE,

BECOMING

JUSTICE BLACKMUN:

HARRY

BLACKMUN'S

SUPREME

JOURNEY 91 (2005).

26. George Gallup, Abortion Seen up to Wornan, Doctor, WASH. PosT, Aug. 25, 1972, at A2.

COURT
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Fifty-six percent of Catholics agreed.
Fifty-nine percent of Democrats agreed.
And this may surprise you: Sixty-eight percent of Republicans
agreed.2 7
As did, of course, seven middle-aged to elderly Supreme Court
Justices, including three of the four appointed by Richard Nixon, all of
whom quite plausibly may have believed that their decision, while likely
to provoke some controversy, essentially ratified the views of the public
mainstream.
And on the other hand, of course, are those who claim that public
opinion, however measured, was irrelevant; that Roe v. Wade was the
rogue opinion of a misguided Supreme Court; and that, through error or
arrogance or both, the Court intruded where it did not belong, usurped
the democratic process, and in doing so, unleashed a firestorm that has
0 28
shaped our politics ever since.
For a new book, Before Roe v. Wade,29 my co-author, Reva Siegel of
Yale Law School, and I have recently concluded an intense examination
of the pre-Roe abortion debate in the United States. I can tell you that
there is a lot about this complex chapter in social, political, and legal
history that remains elusive. But I want to use this occasion to address it,
for two reasons. One is to redress a historical misunderstanding of Roe's
aftermath, the widely held backlash theory that depicts the decision as
having ignited a conflagration.30 In fact, that bed was on fire when the
Court lay down on it, as I hope to demonstrate. The second reason is that
the inquiry raises the deeper question of the institutional limits on the
Supreme Court's ability to gather knowledge - either about cases in
particular or the world in general. If we accept the premise that the
Supreme Court tends to navigate in the main channel of public opinion,
we have to be concerned about the danger that the Court will
occasionally run aground in a fog of faulty assumptions and incomplete
information.
How do judges know what they know-or what they think they
know? We only have to recall October Term 2007 and the embarrassing
episode of the Court's decision in Kennedy v. Louisiana3' to see in high
relief the extent to which the Supreme Court, regarding itself as bound in
27. Id.

28. There is a rich literature expressing this view. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 99-96 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part);
David Brooks, Roe's Birth, and Death, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2005, at A23; Jeffrey Rosen, The Day
After Roe, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 2005, at 56,57.
29. LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE
ABoRTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING (20IO).
30. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 505 U.S. at 995-96; Brooks, supra note 28; Rosen, supra
note 28.
31. I28 S.Ct. 2641 (2008).
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a formal sense by the record below, can easily become the victim of the
partial information of which it is a passive recipient.
Kennedy v. Louisiana was the decision in which the Court, applying
its counting-by-states capital jurisprudence, discerned a national consensus
against imposing the death penalty for the rape of a child.32 The majority
based that conclusion on the fact that only a handful of states had made
child rape a capital offense and that Congress, while tinkering
periodically with the federal criminal code, had not included child rape
among federal crimes punishable by death.3
Except that Congress had-in a 2oo6 amendment to the Uniform
Code of Military Justice that made the rape of a child subject to the
death penalty in the military.34 Neither the parties nor their amici had
informed the Justices of this fact. The Solicitor General had not even
filed a brief to assert a federal interest in the outcome of the case. It is
hard to say whether the five-to-four decision might have come out the
other way had the Court known of the recent federal enactment from the
beginning of its consideration. After supplemental briefing, the majority
simply took note of the situation and reaffirmed its opinion." But the
episode reminds us to be humble in our assumptions about what the
Court knows-even of readily ascertainable facts, let alone something as
amorphous and malleable as public opinion.
What did the Court know, or think it knew, about abortion?
Although Roe v. Wade is often depicted as a bolt out of the blue, a
bombshell that landed on an unsuspecting and unprepared populace, it is
important to recall that the decision was neither the product of a snap
judgment nor one that fell outside the parameters of public expectation.
The case was, after all, the subject of two high-visibility arguments. 6 It
was pending at the Supreme Court for the unusually long period of
twenty-seven months, through three Terms-from October 1970, when
the jurisdictional statement reached the Court, until January 22. 1973,
when the decision was issued. An article in the January 2, 1973, New
York Times discussed the prospect of a renewed fight over the
"explosive" issue of abortion in the state legislative session about to
open, and then noted that the issue might soon be taken out of the hands
of the governor and the legislature, "since the Supreme Court is expected
to rule definitively on abortion, perhaps within a month or two.
32. Id. at 2657-58.

33. Id.at 2653.
34. See National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. io9-163, § 552(b)(i),1 19 Stat. 3136,
3263 (2006) (codified at io U.S.C. § 920 (2oo6)); Linda Greenhouse. In Court Ruling on Executions, a
Factual Flaw, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2008, at Ai.
35. See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2653 n..
36. See Roe v.Wade,41o U.S. 113. 113 (1973)37. See id.
38. Tom Buckley, Both Sides Gird for Renewal of Fight on Legalized Abortion, Explosive
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Anyone reading the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade-as few of
those who expound upon it actually do-will be struck by the physiciancentric framework that the Court establishes for the exercise of the right
to abortion that it is declaring. "The decision vindicates the right of the
physician to administer medical treatment according to his professional
judgment," the opinion states in summary, a few paragraphs from the
end." Many people assume that this focus reflects the background of
Justice Blackmun, the opinion's author, who had served as general
counsel to the Mayo Clinic, had many friends who were doctors, and was
deeply interested in medical subjects.40
But in fact, abortion reform had first made its appearance in public
conversation as a public health issue, and it did not require Harry
Blackmun's special medical connections to see it that way. In 1960, the
American Public Health Association published in its Journal an article
by Dr. Mary Calderone, who at the time was medical director of Planned
Parenthood, entitled Illegal Abortion as a Public Health Problem.4 The
public health profession began prodding other, more conservative
medical organizations to rethink their opposition to legalized abortion. It
took the better part of a decade but, as I noted earlier, the American
Medical Association eventually did so after years of study and debate."
It is worth noting that the medical and, to a lesser extent, the legal
profession embraced the cause of abortion reform before the women's
movement made legal abortion a cause. The National Organization for
Women (NOW) was founded in 1966 with the goal of ending
discrimination against women in the workplace.43 The "Bill of Rights"
that NOW adopted in 1967 comprised eight "demands."" The first was
for passage of the Equal Rights Amendment.45 The next six all dealt with
aspects of access for women to full participation in the economy, through
enforcement of anti-discrimination laws and policies, availability of child
care, reform of maternity leave policies, and equality of access to
education.46 Only the last referred to assuring "the right of women to

Legislative Issue, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 2, 1973, at 78.
39. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165.
40. GREENHOUSE, supra note 25, at 18.
41. Mary Steichen Calderone, Illegal Abortion as a Public Health Problem, 50 AM. J. Pun.
HEALTH 948 (1960).
42. GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 29, at 25-29.
43. See NAT'L ORG. FOR WOMEN, THE NAT'L ORG. FOR WOMEN'S 1966 STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
(1966), http://www.now.org/history/purpos66.html.
44. NATrL ORG. FOR WOMEN, NAT'L ORG. FOR WOMEN (N.O.W.) BILL OF RIGHTS,
http://coursesa.matrx.msu.edu/ht23/documenlts/nowrights.html.

45. Id.
46. Id.

1968 (1968),
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control their reproductive lives" by removing legal limitations on access
to birth control and abortion.47
It was Betty Friedan's great contribution to understand and
articulate the link between those demands. Only by having control over
their reproductive lives could women have the power to plan and define
their lives and become full participants in the economy. In a fiery speech
to the Illinois Citizens for Medical Control of Abortion in February 1969,
Friedan described the right to abortion not as one element in a program
of economic empowerment, but as essential to women's "full selfdetermination" and "full dignity."8 "Your cause is now mine," Friedan
declared.49 NARAL was born at that conference. 0
Eighteen months later, Friedan organized the "women's strike for
equality" to mark the fiftieth anniversary of women's suffrage, August
26, 1970.' Her point was that the right to vote had not achieved
meaningful equality. It was a day of nationwide marches and rallies that
garnered considerable media attention and swelled NOW's ranks.
Marchers carried signs that called for "free 24-hour child care" and "free
abortion on demand."
This kind of agitation and rhetoric did not go unobserved. Nor was
it occurring without context. The march toward reform was taking place
not only in the streets, but in legislatures and courts in the year 197o. The
repeal of New York's abortion law had just taken effect, and women
were flocking to New York for safe, legal, and reasonably low-cost
abortions.53 In June, a three-judge federal district court, acting on a
complaint filed three months earlier, had struck down the Texas abortion
law, which permitted abortion only to save a woman's life, as
unconstitutionally broad, vague, and in violation of a woman's
"fundamental" right to decide whether to have children.54 Yes, the Roe v.
Wade plaintiffs actually won in district court-they appealed to the
Supreme Court because the district court had issued only a declaratory
judgment and failed to give injunctive relief."

47. Id.
48. GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 29, at 40.
49. Id. at 38.
So. Id. Founded as the National Association for Repeal of Abortion Laws, this advocacy
organization is now called NARAL Pro-Choice America. See NARAL Pro-Choice America, Key
Moments in NARAL Pro-Choice America's History, http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/about-us/
learn-about-us/history.html (last visited June 24, 2010).
51. GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 29, at 41-44.
52. Id. at 44 (graphic image).
53. Id. at 150.
54. Roe v. wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1225 (N.D. Tex. 1970), affd in part, rev'd in part, 410 U.S.
113 ('973).
55. See id.
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These events caused great concern within the Catholic Church,
which mobilized on a variety of fronts. In New York, pressure brought by
the church and its affiliated Right to Life Committee caused the
legislature in 1972 to repeal the repeal, and only Governor Rockefeller's
veto kept the 1970 reform from being erased. 6 Catholic scholars, both lay
and clergy, confident in their own faithful, worked hard to find a secular
language in which opposition to abortion could reach and mobilize the
non-Catholic community. They did this by invoking the language of
international human rights, and even of the domestic struggle for civil
rights, on behalf of the unborn, and they were aided by the wide
circulation of photographs of the developing fetus as well as by
disturbing images of fetuses dismembered by abortion. 7
Phyllis Schlafly, a brilliant strategist of the political right who had
formed an organization to defeat the Equal Rights Amendment, was
among the first to articulate what anyone who thought about the matter
might have concluded: that what the abortion-rights advocates were
proposing had to do with much more than reproduction, more even than
the fetus and its "right to life."" What was at stake was the social order
itself: the role of women, the organization of families. Abortion, in other
words, had migrated far from concerns about public health and
population, and had taken on a social and cultural meaning that made
profound social conflict inevitable.
The migration of the slogan "abortion on demand" captures this
rapidly shifting resonance. Originally, it was a feminist slogan offered in
opposition to the so-called therapeutic abortion reform laws that had
replaced the old criminal laws.59 Under these new laws, a woman could
theoretically obtain a legal abortion, but first she had to satisfy several
doctors-three in the Georgia law that was successfully challenged in
Doe v. Bolton6 0-that
she met particular criteria entitling her to
terminate a pregnancy. "Abortion on demand" simply meant that
women were competent to decide the matter for themselves without
being judged or evaluated by doctors, and that they could seek abortion
as they sought any other medical service.
But as the meaning of abortion shifted from the medical to the
social and cultural, "abortion on demand" came to be used against
feminists and their claims and to signify a reckless, amoral selfindulgence. This was the sense in which President Nixon used the phrase
in 1971, when he repudiated a Pentagon policy that had allowed military

56. GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 29, at 158-6o.
57. Id. at 99--1oo.
58. Id. at 21I8-20.
59. Id. at 249-50.
6o. 410 U.S. 179, 203 (I97).
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servicewomen to have abortions in any military hospital. 6' "Abortion on
demand," the President said, could not be "square[d] with my personal
belief in the sanctity of human life.""
Soon enough, abortion took on a political resonance as well. Nixon's
political advisors in his 1972 reelection campaign urged him to use the
abortion issue to challenge the traditional Democratic Party allegiance of
urban Catholic voters." The Democratic nominee, George McGovern,
had expressed only equivocal support for abortion rights, but following a
policy memo dubbed by its author, Patrick Buchanan, as the "assault
book," the Nixon campaign succeeded in pinning three Scarlet As on the
Democratic candidate, labeling him the "triple-A candidate" for amnesty
(for Vietnam War draft evaders), acid (and other illegal drugs), and
abortion.

64

This is a very abbreviated account of a complex and tumultuous
two-and-one-half year period, from the Women's Strike for Equality in
the summer of 1970 to Richard Nixon's reelection in November 1972.
Recall that this period corresponds almost exactly with the period during
which Roe v. Wade, filed at the Supreme Court in October 1970, was
awaiting decision. By the end of that period, the reaction against
abortion reform had been carefully nurtured and propelled across the
political landscape. But yet the messages of reaction were not in general
circulation. They were precisely targeted to where they would do the
most good. They were not meant for all ears, and they may not have
been reflected in polls designed to test the existence of diffuse support
for abortion rights. Today, when you mention the Triple-A antiMcGovern slogan to political conservatives, you find immediate
recognition. Among political liberals or those who were unengaged in
politics in the early 1970s, you are likely to get a blank look. I was a voter
in 1972, and I paid close attention to politics, yet I do not remember ever
hearing the slogan.
By the 1972 election, in any event, the Court's decision in Roe was a
fait accompli. Essentially, all that remained was for the members of the
majority formally to join Justice Blackmun's opinion and for them to add
whatever else they wished to say in concurring opinions. Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger, who would soon enough prove to be the weakest link
in the Court's abortion-rights majority, was perhaps, through his
sympathies with the Nixon administration, the most in touch with how
the discourse had shifted during Roe's prolonged sojourn at the Court.
"Plainly, the Court today rejects any claim that the Constitution requires

6i. GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 29, at 198.
62. Id.

63. Id.at 215-r8.
64. Id.at 215-16, 267.
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abortions on demand," he wrote in the closing line of a three-paragraph
concurring opinion.6
Outside the Court's quiet precincts, a conflagration was raging. The
decision acted as an accelerant, certainly, but the Supreme Court did not
ignite the blaze. Roe v. Wade entered the Court from one world and
emerged twenty-seven months later into another. We understand that
world today through the lens of Roe, but it is a distorting lens. Our story
offers, I think, a cautionary tale for those who seek to understand the
relationship between the Supreme Court and public opinion. It is an
understanding worth seeking, but not always easy to find.
Polls that are adequate to measure diffuse support can fail to
measure the passionate mobilization by a minority. The National
Opinion Research Center has been polling on abortion at least since the
mid-i96os. In 1972, on the eve of Roe, it asked whether abortion should
be legal for a variety of reasons, including whether the "[f]amily has very
low income and cannot afford any more children," the "[w]oman is
married and does not want more children," and the "[w]oman is not
married and does not want to marry the man." 66 Responses across the
ensuing decades have been quite stable. For example:
* Family can't afford more children as a reason for abortion:6 7
1972: Yes, 46%.
2oo8: Yes, 41%.

* Married woman doesn't want more children:
1972:

Yes, 38%.

2008: Yes, 43%.
* Unmarried woman doesn't want to marry the man:69
1972:

Yes, 41%.

2008: Yes, 39%.
The National Opinion Research Center did not begin until 1977 to
ask whether abortion should be legal if the woman wants one "for any
reason" (what we might call "abortion on demand"). 70
1977:
2008:

Yes, 37%.

Yes, 40%.
Someone landing from Mars and being presented with these figures
would find it hard to imagine that the thirty-seven years since Roe have
seen electoral and judicial politics revolving around the question of

65. 410U.S. at 208.
66. KARLYN BOWMAN & ANDREW RUGG, Am. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. PoLIcY RESEARCH, AEl PUBLIC
OPINION
STUDIEs:
ATrITUDEs ABouT
ABORTION
ii-12
(20o),
http://www.aei.org/docLib/
Public% 200pinion%2oStudy% 20-% zoAbortion% 202oio.pdf.

67. Id. at I I.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 12.
70. Id.
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abortion, with the Supreme Court continually pressed to cut back on the
right that it declared and-under the leadership of Justices chosen in no
small part because of their known or assumed opposition to abortionperhaps more likely to do so now than at any time in the past. The last
Justice who joined the Supreme Court without abortion playing a role in
the nomination or confirmation process was John Paul Stevens. Named
to the Court in December 1975, almost three years post-Roe, he was not
asked a single question about abortion at his confirmation hearing.?
During those three years, the issue had not yet become the driving force
in our politics that it would be five years later, when the Republican
Party platform pledged to support only those judicial nominees who
opposed a right to abortion.72 What has the court been doing for all these
years-ratifying public opinion or defying it? Barry Friedman asks us to
"[i]magine the Court as tethered to public opinion by a bungee cord," 73
with a certain freedom of movement but with the ever-present prospect
of being ultimately "snapped back into line." 74 Does that image of free
movement within dynamic boundaries hold when individuals are chosen
for the Court and arrive at the Court in full awareness that they may
someday be called upon to reaffirm or to repudiate Roe v. Wade-or
whatever Roe v. Wade has become since that January day in 1973-and
that their place in history may depend on which side they choose? Does
abortion present a special case, or a case in point?

71. GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 29, at 258; see also Linda Greenhouse. Justice John Paul
Stevens as Abortion-Rights Strategist, 43 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 749,75! (2olo).
72. Republican Party Platform of 1980, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid=2584.
73. FRIEDMAN, supra note I, at 373.
74. Id.

